Map a credible, jurisdiction-agnostic transition pathway from representative winner-take-all democracy to sector-level multi-proposal portfolio selection -- identifying the minimum viable institutional changes required at each phase and the political economy of managing incumbent resistance.

Institutional transition theory (North, Acemoglu), comparative analysis of successful democratic reforms (New Zealand MMP 1996, Ireland referendum 2018, Iceland constitutional process 2011), and staged reform modeling drawing on federalism literature for parallel-track governance design.

Three historical lessons dominate the comparative reform literature. First, successful democratic transitions never begin at the constitutional level -- they begin at the margins, in pilot jurisdictions or advisory roles, where the new mechanism can demonstrate legitimacy before threatening incumbent power.

New Zealand's MMP reform succeeded because it was framed as a proportionality correction, not a system replacement. Ireland's Citizens Assembly succeeded because it was formally advisory -- giving political cover to legislators who could adopt its recommendations without surrendering authority.

Second, the critical transition resource is demonstrated quality, not political mandate. When a new mechanism produces visibly better outputs than the incumbent system, resistance becomes politically costly. The strategy is to make the portfolio model undeniably better before making it mandatory.

Third, incumbents resist reform most effectively when it threatens all their power simultaneously. Sector-by-sector transition is therefore strategically superior to comprehensive reform -- each sector transition is a smaller political battle and generates evidence that reduces resistance in the next sector. A four-phase transition model follows from these lessons.

Phase 1 -- Shadow Assemblies (years 1-3): Sector citizen assemblies operate in parallel to existing government, producing formal policy recommendations on merit-evaluated proposals. No binding authority -- pure legitimacy building. Platform infrastructure like FTS provides the evaluation engine.

Phase 2 -- Formal Advisory Status (years 3-7): Legislation grants sector assemblies formal advisory status, requiring legislators to publicly respond to assembly recommendations. Proposals adopted by assemblies that legislators reject must be explained publicly -- creating accountability pressure without removing legislative authority.

Phase 3 -- Binding in Pilot Sectors (years 7-12): One or two sectors (typically those with lowest incumbent resistance -- local infrastructure, education curriculum) adopt binding portfolio selection. Implementation evidence from pilot sectors builds the empirical case for broader adoption.

Phase 4 -- Constitutional Entrenchment: After demonstrated success across multiple sectors, constitutional amendment separates policy selection authority (sector assemblies) from policy implementation authority (elected government). The transition is complete without a single revolutionary moment.