Assess the current and projected capabilities of synthetic biology tools, quantify the dual-use risk trajectory, and evaluate the adequacy of existing biosecurity governance frameworks.

Capability trajectory analysis of gene synthesis costs, DNA assembly tools, and AI-assisted protein design. Expert elicitation across 45 biosecurity specialists. Gap analysis of existing governance frameworks against projected capability timelines.

05/base pair in 2025 — a 200x reduction following Moore's Law. Desktop DNA synthesizers are commercially available for under $10,000. AI tools (AlphaFold, ESMFold) can now predict protein structures and suggest functional modifications that previously required years of expert research.

The convergence of cheap synthesis, AI-assisted design, and expanding biological knowledge is lowering the barrier to engineer dangerous pathogens from nation-state level to small-group level within this decade.

Current governance: the Biological Weapons Convention has no verification mechanism; US export controls on DNA synthesizers cover only 40% of global suppliers; screening databases for dangerous sequences cover only known pathogens — novel designs evade detection.