The core defect in sovereign debt restructuring isn't a missing forum, it's a missing deadline with teeth. This idea combines three existing-but-disconnected legal tools into one mechanism so that private and non-Paris-Club bilateral creditors face the same time pressure official creditors already face.

First, mandate single-limb aggregated Collective Action Clauses (already drafted by ICMA in its 2014 model language, but adopted inconsistently and never retroactively) as the default in every new sovereign bond issuance under New York and English law, the two legal regimes that govern the overwhelming majority of emerging-market sovereign bonds.

Single-limb aggregation lets a single supermajority vote across all of a country's outstanding bond series bind holdouts on every series at once, closing the loophole where a creditor buys a small position in one series specifically to block that series' restructuring.

Second, attach a certified standstill to IMF program approval: when the IMF Executive Board approves an Extended Credit Facility or Extended Fund Facility program for a country that has also triggered the G20 Common Framework, all creditor classes — official bilateral, multilateral, and private — enter a simultaneous 12-month debt-service standstill, renewable once by mutual creditor-committee vote.

This replaces the current sequencing problem, where official creditors negotiate and settle first while private creditors watch and wait, with a single clock that starts for everyone at once.

Third, create a small treaty-based Sovereign Debt Adjudication Facility, housed administratively at an existing neutral body like the Permanent Court of Arbitration, with jurisdiction limited to ruling on comparability-of-treatment disputes referred either voluntarily or automatically when a standstill expires without agreement.

Its rulings gain force not through a supranational enforcement army but through a narrower, more achievable commitment: participating jurisdictions (starting with the UK and, ideally, New York State) agree that courts within their jurisdiction will decline to enforce a holdout creditor's judgment against a sovereign that is in a certified standstill or complying with a Facility ruling.

This is the same legal technique the UK and Belgium already used in their 2010-2011 'vulture fund' laws that capped recoverable amounts for defaulted debt bought at distressed prices — it doesn't require a new global treaty body with police powers, just an extension of a precedent that already exists and already survived legal challenge.

None of this requires China or other non-Paris-Club bilateral creditors to formally join a body they don't control; it works by changing what New York and English courts will enforce, which is where the actual leverage over private bondholders already sits.